Stowaways remain a significant security and operational risk for vessels calling at ports in West Africa. Two recent cases handled by Skuld once again highlight the persistent stowaway risk in the region and the importance of conducting thorough and systematic physical searches. Even where professional third-party security services and trained search dogs are employed, the vessel's own search remains a critical element of effective stowaway prevention.
Effective prevention requires strict access control, vigilant watchkeeping and thorough, vessel-specific physical searches. Third-party security measures, including searches using trained dogs, should be regarded as an additional layer of protection and should supplement, rather than replace, the vessel's own stowaway searches.
Recent cases and lessons learnt
In the first case, in early August 2026, seven stowaways were discovered several days after the vessel's departure, when they emerged from hiding. They claimed to have boarded at Tema, Ghana, and concealed themselves in the vessel's crane house. The vessel had subsequently called at San Pedro, Côte d'Ivoire. Shore-based searches using trained dogs had been carried out before departure from both ports, but the stowaways remained undetected.
Two months later, another vessel discovered seven Ghanaian stowaways following a call at Tema. They reportedly boarded via the gangway and concealed themselves around the access ladder area of a cargo hold body hatch. Despite third-party searches using trained dogs, they remained undetected until several days after the vessel's departure, when they emerged in search of food and water.
The two cases highlight several important lessons. The stowaways were eventually found in areas that were not particularly difficult to access or inspect and should have been covered by a properly planned physical search. This raises questions about the thoroughness of the vessel's own stowaway search and underlines the danger of treating it as a routine checklist exercise.
The cases also highlight potential weaknesses in gangway and access control, particularly during busy cargo operations when large numbers of stevedores, contractors and other shore personnel may be moving on and off the vessel.
Both incidents demonstrate the limitations of relying solely on third-party shore-based security services, including searches using trained dogs. These services can provide an important additional layer of protection but should not create a false sense of security or replace the crew's own search.
Effective prevention therefore requires more than simply having security measures in place: it depends on strict access control and a systematic, vessel-specific physical search, with sufficient time allocated for its thorough execution.
Best practices
For vessels calling at ports with an elevated stowaway risk, Skuld recommends a layered approach centred on access control and systematic physical searches.
Before arrival, the Master and Ship Security Officer should assess the local risk and prepare a vessel-specific search plan identifying potential hiding places, including cargo holds and access ladders, chain lockers, forecastle stores, crane houses, storerooms, lifeboats, steering gear spaces, rudder trunk spaces, funnel and other infrequently visited spaces.
During the port stay, strict gangway control should be maintained, and the movement of all persons boarding and leaving the vessel should be closely monitored. Restricted spaces should remain secured where practicable and consistent with operational and safety requirements.
Two physical stowaway searches must be carried out:
- The first search should be conducted before the vessel departs from the berth, preferably after completion of cargo operations and the departure of shore personnel, and as close to sailing as practicable.
- The second search should be conducted after pilot disembarkation, where safe and practicable, to identify anyone who may have boarded or changed hiding place between the first search and departure.
Importantly, sufficient time must be allocated for each stowaway search. As a practical planning allowance, approximately three to four hours may be required for a comprehensive search, depending on the vessel's size and type, and the difficulty of inspecting potential hiding places. This is not a fixed standard, and the time allowed should reflect the vessel's circumstances.
The time allocated for the search should not be reduced merely to meet the sailing schedule. Search teams should be assigned clearly defined areas and physically inspect potential hiding places before reporting those areas as clear. Stowaways may conceal themselves beneath ropes, safety nets or other materials, making them difficult to detect. Such materials and spare parts should therefore be moved, where safe to do so, to allow a thorough inspection of the spaces beneath and behind them. A hurried visual check is not sufficient.
Professional guards and searches using trained dogs may provide an additional safeguard, but a negative third-party dog search should not be regarded as conclusive evidence that no stowaways are on board. Ultimately, effective stowaway prevention depends not on completing a checklist or obtaining a search certificate, but on ensuring that the vessel has been thoroughly searched.
Loss prevention recommendations
The company should establish clear stowaway search procedures appropriate to each vessel's trade, type and operating conditions. Each vessel should maintain a vessel-specific search plan identifying potential hiding places and dividing all areas requiring inspection into clearly defined search zones.
Responsibility for each zone should be assigned to designated crew members or search teams, who should physically inspect all identified spaces and potential hiding places. Search records should identify the areas inspected, the personnel involved, completion times and any limitations. These arrangements should ensure that searches are systematic, accountable and verifiable, rather than merely a checklist exercise.
Members and Masters trading to higher-risk West African ports are recommended to:
- Maintain strict gangway and access control throughout the port stay, closely monitoring the movement of stevedores, contractors and other shore personnel.
- Implement the vessel-specific search plan, with clearly assigned responsibilities for each search zone.
- Allow sufficient time for thorough physical search, which may require several hours depending on the vessel and the difficulty of inspecting potential hiding places.
- Carry out two searches where safe and practicable: one before departure from the berth and another after pilot disembarkation.
- Control access to areas that have already been searched and recheck them where necessary.
- Use professional guards and searches using trained dogs as additional safeguards, not substitutes for the crew's own search.
- Pay particular attention to cargo holds and access ladders, crane houses, accessible rudder trunk spaces, stores and other restricted or seldom-visited spaces.
- Follow applicable safety procedures and report any areas that cannot be safely or fully inspected to the Master or Ship Security Officer.
- Properly record the searches and security measures taken, including any outstanding checks or follow-up actions.
If stowaways are discovered, Members should notify Skuld promptly so that appropriate advice and assistance can be provided.
Effective implementation of the above best practices and recommendations can significantly reduce the risk of stowaways gaining access to or remaining undetected on board. A well-planned and properly executed stowaway prevention programme not only reduces the likelihood of operational disruption, delay and associated costs, but also contributes to the safety and security of the vessel and her crew throughout the voyage.