The maritime risk picture has escalated markedly. The Joint Maritime Information Center (JMIC) now assesses the regional maritime threat as CRITICAL (an attack is almost inevitable) after confirmed missile/projectile strikes on multiple merchant vessels in the Gulf of Oman/Strait of Hormuz approaches within the past 24 hours. The UKMTO continues to describe the wider area as highly volatile, warning of sustained GNSS/AIS/VHF interference and noting that VHF claims of a “closure” of the Strait are unverified and not legally binding. In parallel, the U.S. MARAD Maritime Alert 2026‑001A advises vessels to avoid the region where possible and to maintain at least 30 nm separation from US naval units while remaining in contact with NCAGS and monitoring UKMTO/JMIC outputs.
Flag‑state postures have also tightened. The Norwegian Maritime Authority has raised MARSEC/ISPS Level 3 for Norwegian‑flagged vessels in the Persian Gulf, Strait of Hormuz and Gulf of Oman, signalling a probable or imminent security incident that requires further, specific protective measures under the ISPS Code.
Beyond Hormuz, Lloyd’s List reports the US Navy has established a broad maritime warning zone and cautions that Houthi retaliation in the Red Sea/Bab al‑Mandab cannot be excluded; the EU’s EUNAVFOR ASPIDES mission remains on heightened readiness. Taken together, there is a credible risk of dual‑theatre disruption (Hormuz and Red Sea/BaM) if these trends coincide.
Current situation: Strait of Hormuz, Gulf of Oman and adjacent waters
JMIC confirms three separate vessel attacks in the last 24 hours:
- SKYLIGHT (IMO 9330020) was hit 5 nm north of Khasab with the crew evacuated and four injuries reported;
- MKD VYOM (IMO 9284386) sustained a projectile strike above the waterline with the fire subsequently controlled;
- SEA LA DONNA (IMO 9380532) reported an attack now under investigation.
JMIC adds that no sea mines have been detected, and it has identified no specific targeting rationale that would distinguish these ships from other commercial traffic.
Although many ships have received VHF hails asserting that the Strait is closed, there is no formal legal closure: JMIC notes no NAVAREA warning, no IMO Maritime Safety Information broadcast, and no charted exclusion zone.
The observed slowdown is a function of operator risk response rather than a promulgated suspension of transit passage. Even so, the throughput reduction is material: against a historic daily average of roughly 138 vessels, the most recent 24‑hour count is around 110.
Port‑side and coastal impacts underline the breadth of exposure. Jebel Ali recorded a debris‑related berth fire following an aerial interception, and anchorage density has increased at both approaches to the Strait; JMIC warns that clustering raises secondary risks - restricted manoeuvring space, anchor dragging, and collision exposure. Electronic warfare effects amplify those hazards: GNSS interference, AIS anomalies, and congested/contradictory VHF are widespread across the Gulf, the Gulf of Oman and Hormuz approaches.
Commercial operators are adapting quickly. Hapag‑Lloyd has suspended all transits of the Strait of Hormuz, while CMA CGM has ordered vessels inside or bound for the Gulf to proceed to shelter pending reassessment. On the financing side, JMIC reports a war‑risk market escalation, including Notices of Cancellation with buy‑back options subject to underwriting.
Red Sea/Bab al‑Mandab - Houthi activity and the “second theatre”
Authoritative industry reporting indicates the Houthis are signalling a resumption of missile/drone activity against maritime targets in the Red Sea/Gulf of Aden following US–Israeli strikes on Iran, ending a months‑long period of relative calm in late‑2025. MARAD’s standing advisory catalogues the group’s tactics, techniques and procedures - from one‑way UAVs/USVs/UUVs to cruise/ballistic missiles, explosive boats, small‑arms fire and seizures - and cautions that targeting has extended beyond vessels with clear Israeli/US affiliations to occasional misidentification and collateral strikes. In anticipation of renewed pressure along the Red Sea corridor, the EU has extended Operation ASPIDES to 28 February 2027, sustaining defensive coverage and situational awareness along the Bab al-Mandeb (BaM) corridor, even as resources remain finite.
The strategic concern is the overlap: a constrained Hormuz at the same time as renewed Red Sea/BaM activity yields a dual‑chokepoint problem with few workable maritime bypasses for Gulf‑bound cargo and heightened uncertainty for schedules, insurance and chartering.
What to do now
- Refresh the Voyage Risk Assessment: before any approach to the affected waters, incorporating the latest JMIC, UKMTO, MARAD and flag‑state directives. Also factor explicitly for dual‑theatre exposure (Hormuz + Red Sea/BaM).
- Operate per the security level in force: Norwegian‑flagged vessels: implement MARSEC/ISPS Level 3 measures in the Persian Gulf/Strait of Hormuz/Gulf of Oman; whereas other flags should escalate posture per CSO guidance and flag instructions.
- Communicate and verify: Pre‑register/report with UKMTO; maintain a continuous VHF Ch.16 watch; respond professionally to directed hails; where practicable maintain ≥30 nm from U.S. naval units per MARAD. Treat unverified “closure” broadcasts as situational inputs, not legal restrictions - while still guarding against miscalculation near military units.
- Navigate with redundancy: Expect GNSS/AIS degradation; cross‑check positions with radar ranges, visual bearings and echo sounder; preserve screenshots and VDR extracts when anomalies occur to support insurance and post‑incident analysis.
- Manage density and timing: In congested approaches, plan generous CPAs, predictable courses/speeds and, where feasible, consider delaying, rerouting, or seeking escort/accompaniment recognising finite naval capacity (e.g., ASPIDES in Red Sea/BaM; situational awareness toward Hormuz).